By: Maxime Fritsch & Abdulrahman Baboraik

From the 20th century and into 2026, maritime logistics through the Strait of Hormuz have been the primary mode of transport in the Gulf, with no major interruptions even during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). However, when disruptions persist at Hormuz, vulnerability increases. Since February 2026, blockades have disrupted flows through the Strait of Hormuz, prompting regional states and international players to reconsider how maritime logistics may shape the region to prevent future disruptions at this vital chokepoint.

 Arabian Gulf Asset Transforms into Vulnerability: The Hormuz Factor
The Arabian Gulf’s location has historically been a unique benefit. Its position due to abundant oil and gas resources, as well as the interconnectedness of neighbouring states, has long been advantageous. Additionally, with globalisation, the ports in the Gulf have become increasingly attractive because of the region’s strategic position at the crossroads of Asia and Europe. However, as regional vulnerabilities grow, this advantage is increasingly being challenged among the consequences of the Iran-United States conflict of 2026, the disruption of logistics in the region stands out. Two distinct patterns characterise current trade: disruption and displacement to less volatile or better-located areas. Under this framework, states located inside the Arabian Gulf suffer more in trade and logistics by sea than those located outside these waters. Blocking such chokepoints, which remain vital for the Gulf and Asian economies alike, creates a path for regional actors to address the opening of the strait through various methods or to develop alternatives. For the GCC economies, the logistics and transportation sector’s contribution to GDP ranged from 4% to 8% in 2022, depending on the country.

Before the war, the Gulf states managed to insert themselves into various logistics projects through corridors, notably the IMEC (India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor) and the INSTC (International North-South Transport Corridor), but the viability of these projects is now in question. 

From Road and Rail Alternatives to New Maritime Projects
Given the strategic vulnerability of being located in a sea accessible only through the Strait of Hormuz, the states in this region have made significant efforts to reassess logistics and develop alternative corridors to bypass the Strait, aiming to prevent future disruptions. The Gulf States’ maritime exposure is marked by two geographical patterns: some rely solely on the Strait of Hormuz for access, while others have an additional maritime interface. Saudi Arabia benefits from Red Sea access; the UAE has a more limited alternative interface at Fujairah and Khor Fakkan ; and Oman — situated primarily along the Arabian Sea — enjoys the greatest degree of insulation from Hormuz disruptions. Therefore, these patterns highlight different effects when crises emerge along Hormuz.

The logistics alternatives strategy has notably focused on mitigating the risk of overreliance on the Strait of Hormuz. Given Saudi oil’s localisation in the Eastern part of the Kingdom, next to the Arabian Gulf, Saudi Arabia anticipated disruptions at Hormuz by developing an oil pipeline during the Iran-Iraq war to transport oil from the East to the West, with its gateway in Yanbu on the Red Sea. The United Arab Emirates also developed a pipeline from Habshan to its interface, located away from Hormuz, with its gateway in Fujairah, which became operational in early 2012. Other projects across Yemen or to the Levant have also interested Gulf states in bypassing Hormuz. These alternatives remain useful for preventing disruptions or a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz; however, their efficiency remains limited by volume, while maritime transport remains more efficient. They are also vulnerable to asymmetric conflict, where they can be targeted. During the Iran war, the capacity to increase the volume of these pipelines was reconsidered. In mid-May 2026, the UAE’s national oil company, Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC), announced plans to construct a new pipeline to double its export capacity to Fujairah by 2027.

Aside from oil and state strategies regarding pipeline alternatives, one of the major challenges has been goods forwarding. Beyond oil and gas, Gulf states remain crucial for fertiliser exports and for their own imports, including food and non-food goods. Therefore, different paths highlight import and export trade, through air, road and rail. Given the temporary closure of some airspace across the Gulf states due to attacks, road transport has remained a viable alternative as well, being cheaper. Multimodal solutions were one of the logistics methods used to bypass instability. The French operator CMA CGM developed this method from UAE ports located away from Hormuz, as well as those in Oman and in the Eastern part of Saudi Arabia, in order to provide services for upper Gulf countries. The UAE reroutes its cargo activities to the ports outside Hormuz, Khor Fakkan and Fujairah, then continues its way through land, rail or plane. These ports, as well as those of Oman, have seen a significant increase in their weekly operations. However, new challenges are imposed on them by container capacity, which is limited to a certain amount, even though they can absorb part of the redirection of flows. The crisis has shown a new interest in increasing the capacity of the ports situated outside Hormuz. 

Saudi Arabia remains the key actor fostering logistics projects. From March to April 2026, Saudi Arabia launched a logistics corridors initiative to redirect cargo from the Arabian Gulf to the Red Sea, emphasising the significance of land and rail transfers, along with the development of five new rail logistics corridors in the freight sector to decrease reliance on trucks and reduce transportation time. Furthermore, in mid-June 2026, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia announced a project to build a railway connecting the Gulf to Türkiye within three years, passing through Jordan and Syria, with a longer-term ambition to extend it to Oman.

These projects, if implemented, will demonstrate that transport flows via land or rail are a key trend in improving connectivity, thereby creating new possibilities for logistics. However, railways across the GCC remain nowadays limited. The GCC regional railway was announced a decade ago but has yet to be realised. Its goal is to connect Kuwait to Oman and cover most of the Eastern part of the Arabian Peninsula over more than 2,000 km. The GCC railway’s decade-long delay is not a technical failure but a political one, and the current crisis may finally provide the political impetus that cost-benefit analyses alone could not. In recent years, progress has been notable, including the formation in 2024 of a joint venture between the UAE and Oman to create Hafeet Rail, which will link the two countries, especially the Omani port of Sohar. The ongoing crisis hastened the completion goal for the railway, which was set to reach 40% completion, according to April 2026 data.
Prompting the Gulf states to anticipate the coming years, overreliance on a single route has led to flow disruptions, even though they have managed to limit this dependence in the past. This crisis underscored the importance of road and rail connectivity and accelerated the development of additional ports away from Hormuz and of corridor projects across the region. Enhancing regional integration is crucial to mitigate disruptions in the Gulf, where intraregional trade remains limited to 5.8% compared to the 60% observed within the European Union, largely because exports are still driven by a hydrocarbon-based economy, a constraint that economic diversification could help overcome to the benefit of regional logistics connectivity.

Where Does Oman Stand in the Situation?
Because of its location mostly within the Arabian Sea, Oman has been able to limit the impacts of the maritime crisis. According to an April 2026 estimate from the International Monetary Fund, Oman will be the only GCC country to see positive GDP growth in the current year (+3.5%). Additionally, as of 8 April 2026, Oman was the only GCC state that had not suffered any losses in its oil exports, even recording surplus sales. In mid-June 2026, the IMF highlighted the role of rising oil prices in strengthening Oman’s economic resilience, reaffirming the country’s ability to withstand regional shocks. As a result, this situation could be explained by both its maritime interface and its lower vulnerability.

International and Regional Logistics lies within Oman’s Vision 2040 ambitions, reinforced in 2016 by the launch of ASYAD’s logistics service provider. Over the past decade, Oman’s port ambitions have been a key pillar of economic diversification for the coming decade. To reach its targets, Oman aimed for logistics to generate 14 billion OMR by 2040, having contributed 1.5 billion OMR in 2014, and to create 300,000 jobs by 2040, starting with 30,000 in 2014.  In 2022, Oman’s logistics and transportation sector contributed 7% to its GDP. This approach is partly inspired by Dubai’s success in maritime and logistics sectors, which benefit from building integrated economic ecosystems. This port model’s success, in this regard, underscores the centrality of logistics to diversification strategies centered on the Jebel Ali infrastructure, which enabled the integration of free zones, advanced logistics services, financial activities, and residential hubs.

For Oman, official data highlighted the maritime sector’s central role, with the sector contributing OMR 16.5 billion in 2025. Among its three main ports, Salalah, Sohar, and Duqm, the Port of Salalah has been growing in its primary role as a transshipment hub. As for 2024, Oman’s main port, Salalah, had a total container capacity of 6.5 million Twenty-foot equivalent unit (TEU), while the regional main port, Jebel Ali, had 19.5 million TEU. Before the crisis, Omani ports distinguished themselves by qualitative performance, whereas the UAE model was based on quantitative dominance, as exemplified by the Port of Jebel Ali. Omani ports are pursuing accelerated, targeted growth, combining superior operational efficiency with gradual expansion to avoid the costs of overcapacity. This crisis might prompt a reassessment of increasing container capacity, given the new dilemma facing maritime logistics in the Arabian Gulf in the medium term. 

In 2023, the World Bank and S&P Global ranked the Port of Salalah the second most efficient container port in the world, citing its operational efficiency, reduced waiting times, and high productivity. As a result of Maersk, the world’s second-largest operator, suspending maritime activities across the region on 9 March 2026, except for the port of Salalah, Oman has grown and become the primary redirection point for regional maritime traffic, making it a key logistics hub in the region.  The same operator considers the Port of Salalah as one of the two, with Khor Fakkan able to transship cargo booked to Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, moving it by landbridge to Sharjah, then continuing to its final destination via the inter-Gulf network.

Despite Oman being behind four of its GCC neighbors in the Logistics Performance Index in 2023, The redirection and changes created by the Hormuz Crisis could, to a certain extent, benefit Oman’s logistics role in the medium term rather than the short term. While Oman has also experienced limited security incidents affecting its ports, the overall impact has remained comparatively contained. This can be attributed to Oman’s long-standing policy of regional engagement, balanced diplomacy, and constructive relations with all regional stakeholders, which have helped reduce its exposure to escalation risks. Therefore, the risk compared with other states remains limited, and Oman’s geographical position, away from Hormuz, provides a gateway to the region.

While the UAE has established a pipeline to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, Oman has also attracted regional focus due to its strategic location. Connecting this system from the Gulf to Oman, especially to the Port of Duqm, would be an asset for transportation, oil and gas logistics, and industrial development in Oman. Duqm is well positioned for pipelines, and its free zone is also essential for attracting foreign investment and for reexport, as Oman could benefit from the Dubai case.

Among the new logistics trends in the GCC, which focus mainly on land and rail transport, Oman’s position as a re-export hub has strengthened, notably through the ports of Sohar and Salalah. Despite the lack of high connectivity in the railway network across the region, efforts to improve regional connectivity by road have increased. In this regard, Oman and Saudi Arabia opened the first road linking both countries in 2021, and the ongoing modernisation of Oman’s main road links, notably the Salalah-Muscat connection, has increased the capacity and competitiveness of its logistics network between the North and South of the country and beyond to the broader region. This outcome will be a key factor in considering Oman as a potential gateway for logistics in an era of non-regional perturbation.

Despite the fact that during the Gulf crisis, Oman redirected flows from Qatar to its own ports and increased its exports to Qatar during this period, and that the post-crisis outcome has shown the ability of the UAE and Saudi Arabia to increase their logistics role and their influence to increase their imports and exports capacity toward Qatar, the 2026 geopolitical situation is far different in its regional and intensity consequences. 

Considering post-crisis uncertainties, Oman’s ports might offer a more favorable risk/reward profile, especially given that insurance companies are wary of cargo passing through the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s willingness to leverage it, from disruptions to tolls and service fees. These effects will likely bolster logistics hubs located outside Hormuz. Oman’s port integration with the regional railway will be crucial to maintaining its advantage of being away from Hormuz, reducing costs and transit time associated with Hormuz. Indeed, increasing container capacity to attract maritime alliances over the long term, which favour hubs capable of handling tens of millions of containers, is essential. These measures will be key to increasing competitiveness and to strengthening its connectivity network in the regional and international dimensions. In 2023, Oman already benefited from strong international connections, with 40, compared with 25 for Qatar, 49 for Saudi Arabia, and 55 for the UAE. Nowadays, Oman’s appeal to regional and international logistics has increased, and countries are already approaching Oman to enhance economic and logistics cooperation; South Korea, for instance, expressed interest in early June 2026.

Conclusion:
Given the impact of the disruptions in Hormuz on regional actors, the international economy, and insurance since late February, the day after the crisis will prompt a reassessment of their ambitions to prevent a recurrence. Depending on the outcome of the War and any future agreements between Iran and the United States, the disruptions may not be temporary, and Gulf states may become more aware of the need to develop alternatives and to increase their connectivity through roads and railways. The status quo ante bellum appears difficult to restore from multiple perspectives, given the conflict’s far-reaching impacts. Iran might seek to reassert control over the Strait of Hormuz, potentially affecting the economies of the Arabian Gulf, which rely extensively on a single strategic maritime route for trade, energy exports, and industrial connectivity.  What will affect regional logistics connectivity is how Iran could maintain its leverage over the Strait of Hormuz, including disruptions to any fees applied to ships and the rebuilding of trust between the two sides of the Gulf.

From the Gulf’s perspective, deepening their logistical connectivity is not about seeking hypothetical prevention; it is about reducing vulnerability, bypassing chokepoints, and limiting the influence of maritime disruptions that affect their economic development. The fate of logistics and economic development is partially in their hands, as the confrontation between the USA and Israel on the one side and Iran on the other could reimpose Iranian deterrence over Hormuz. Nevertheless, Iran might view the expansion of logistics options as an attempt to isolate him, putting Gulf states in a difficult position. They face the dilemma of either improving alternatives to prevent future disruptions, risking some alienation of Iran, or sticking to the current approach, risking more disruptions and lacking credible alternatives.

From Oman, the current crisis prompted a reassessment of logistics that benefits states located away from Hormuz, as well as those with less strained relations with Iran. Ports are once again at the center of the logistics chain. The shifts produced by the 2026 War remain largely conjunctural, as their long-term sustainability depends on post-crisis dynamics and Oman’s ability to convert these temporary opportunities into durable economic trajectories for market actors. Although the crisis has posed multiple challenges for the Gulf states, Oman may be able to capitalise on the redirection of logistics chains, given Iran’s willingness to maintain influence over the Strait of Hormuz and potentially use it as a strategic bargaining tool in future regional and international negotiations.